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Anti-politics, De-politicisation and Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017. 
 
 
1. Introduction.   
 
‘Global Governance’ is concept in constant construction and conception with alternate or over-
lapping terms such as ‘global social governance’ (Kaasch and Martens, 2015), ‘global administrative 
law’ (Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, 2005) and ‘global policy’ (Stone and Ladi, 2015). From early 
discussions of the concept in the journal Global Governance, scholars have noted with frustration the 
ambiguity of the term (Finkelstein, 1995). Ambiguity is also an opportunity as it allows scholars to 
capture the fluid and rapidly evolving multi-actor character of global governance. Yet, ambiguity and 
lack of societal awareness of the processes and practices of global governance also contribute to its 
de-politicisation.  
 
In this chapter, global governance is defined through a four-fold dispersion of power and authority: 
first, a horizontal inter-governmental policy cooperation between officials and political leaders of 
nation-states whereby sovereignty remains a core value; second, a vertical trans-governmental 
collaboration of national officials with international organisations and international civil servants; 
third a diagonal cooperation across the public sector in  collaboration with private actors in global 
civil society, business, the professions and knowledge industries; and fourth, unilateral private 
initiatives to build global governance.  
 
This four-part typology of the eco-system of global governance imposes an order that does not exist in 
a disordered reality of institutional initiatives and network innovations. Even so, the fragmented 
governance ecosystems that emerge do so both by design and by accident. The veritable diversity of 
policy instruments, practices and structures outlined in part 3 is reflective of creative collaborations to 
contain or control cross-border problems.  
 
Yet, there is also a dual dynamic of de-politicisation. As discussed in part 4, civil society and publics 
can both ameliorate and contribute this dynamic. De-politicisation arises from lack of public 
comprehension of a bewildering array of disconnected governance architectures on the one hand, and 
from technocratic distancing tactics on the other practiced by international civil servants, government 
officials and various experts. The discussion of de-politicisation adheres to the following definition:    
Depoliticisation is a process inextricably bound up with the practice of government 
and the management of populations; it is an act which is central to the functioning of 
contemporary governmental rationality and one which has become an important tool 
for the operation of new forms of power and regulation (Foster, Kerr and Byrne, 2014: 
226).  
At face value, many private modalities of global governance where government is not involved or is 
very much in the background are excluded from this definition. On the other hand, the quote opens 
analysis to new forms of globalised power and transnational regulation that abound in transnational 
spaces of global policy making. Hence, global governance offers new terrain for the analysis of de-
politicisation.  
 
In the next section, the chapter utilises the ‘principles, tactics and tools’ taxonomy of de-politicisation 
(Flinders and Buller, 2006). However, this chapter deviates from this approach in two respects. First, 
it enrols an additional consideration – scientisation – in section 5. Second, it does not start inside the 
 2 
Westphalian nation-state or put ‘politicians’ at the centre of de-politicisation tactics as has been the 
case with much of literature analysing national dynamics.  Rather it puts politicians alongside equally 
powerful and decisive actors such as international civil servants, NGO executives and senior 
leadership of other non-state actors in business, philanthropy and academia who collaborate to “move 
to an indirect governing relationship” (Flinders and Buller, 2006: 296).. 
Finally, rather than ‘anti-politics’, the phrase ‘anti-policy’ is adopted.  This reflects the analytical 
focus on the meso-level of global governance rather than the ‘high politics’ of summitry and 
diplomacy pursued by governments and international organisation.  The discussion in section 6 also 
links anti-policy to ideas of technocracy and growing ranks of ‘experts’ who reconfigure their power 
in novel manner via transnational networks, global policy programs and trans-governmentalism 
(Legrand, 2015).  The chapter concludes by recognising that the scientisation of global governance 
abets de-politicisation, but also recognises the dual dynamic of criticism, innovation and alternative 
(scientific) explanation and interpretation that comes through knowledge networks.   
 
2. De-politicisation 
 
As the Editors to this volume argue, new ‘fuzzy’ forms of governance obscure the explicitly political 
nature of decisions, thus making them appear more technocratic. Citizens become less engaged with 
public debate over those decisions.  In global governance citizens and citizenship are anomalous 
categories. There is no category of ‘global citizen’ with rights and responsibilities in relation to 
‘global government’. Instead, the fragmentation of global policy responsibilities via a proliferation of 
tools, instruments, ‘soft law’, standard-setting with sector specific regulation and partnerships 
cultivates disinterest among citizens and communities. This is compounded by the paucity of societal 
mechanisms for everyday citizens to map, monitor and measure the impacts on governance outcomes 
and processes.  The ordinary citizen is at considerable cognitive distance from transnational policy 
making dynamics and faces high barriers in accessing the institutions of regional and global 
governance.  
 
New political and policy elites have consolidated in the ecosystem of global governance and interact 
regularly with national political elites. These actors may often share the principle of de-politicisation – 
governing at a remove – but the mix of tactics and actors involved are composed differently. The 
tactics of de-politicisation are (i) institutional; (ii) rule-based; and (iii) preference-shaping 
 
Institutional de-politicisation involves tactics of distancing and delegation of authority and 
implementation to other bodies by international organisations and governments.  At the national level 
this has usually meant removing or restricting direct political involvement of politicians to so-called 
‘arms-length bodies’; institutional tools such as quangos, non-departmental public bodies and 
agencies.   At global and regional levels the mechanisms and instruments of de-politicisation for 
international organisations and governments, are new innovations of indirect governance such as 
‘global public private partnerships’ (GPPPs) and transnational networks as well as informal 
international organisations like the Group of 20 (G20). These policy-making structures provide some 
operational flexibility, especially for quasi-public (or semi-private) bodies like GAVI (formerly 
known as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation) in financing and delivery of services. 
 
Rule based de-politicisation builds in explicit rules into decision making that are as “neutral and 
universal as possible” for rules that discriminate in favour or against some states are likely to generate 
non-compliance with treaties or other multilateral agreements.  In the case of global governance, it is 
less the case of legal and regulatory constraints that are ‘hard’ and often involve sanctions, and more 
the case of ‘soft law’. That is, voluntary standards, benchmarks, ‘best practice’ and other kinds of 
targets (Hansen and Mühlen-Schulte, 2012).  For instance, the standard-setting roles of ISO 
(International Organisation of Standardisation) or the peer review processes of the OECD that both 
promote, through different tools, harmonisation and convergence. Likewise, the MDGs (Millennium 
Development Goals) are a set of calculative practices that function as a ‘mentality of rule’ connecting 
populations and spaces to particular global social programmes aimed at transforming them (Ilcan and 
Phillips, 2010: 845).  
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De-politicisation through preference-shaping and agenda-setting in transnational policy venues 
speaks to the establishment of a ‘dominant rationality’ and non-decision-making dynamics that 
systematically delete certain problems or issues from public debate and policy consideration. 
Expertise is deployed to entrench a certain way of ‘seeing’ and defining problems, and the 
development of models and methodologies to ‘manage’ such problems. Additionally, the theories and 
concepts not only provide ‘cause-and-effect’ explanations of problems and their solutions for 
decision-makers but also deliver legitimation for the choice of tools such as GPPPs, networks and soft 
law. Adopted and broadcast by leading international organisations, the theory of ‘Global Public 
Goods’ is represented as a neutral and rational economic analysis of global public ‘bads’ (and thus 
made distinct from ‘ideological’ accounts of the evils of capitalism or neo-liberalism). This theory, 
amongst others, has provided intellectual ammunition for the mandate creep of international 
organisations  into new fields of policy action. It also supports preference shaping for authorising their 
central role in global governance, as reflected in the manner in which they are now immediately 
recognisable by their acronyms – IMF, WHO, OECD, ISO, G20, etc (for a discussion see Brousseau, 
et al, 2012) .  
 
Where these tactics might be directed centrally by politicians within the nation-state, in global 
governance there is far less synchronisation. Instead, the fragmentation of policy responsibilities 
among a plethora of global actors and institutions compounds de-politicisation. There is no sovereign 
order. Routes for transparency and accountability are split and truncated due in large part to the 
multiplicity of global and regional policy initiatives. The extensiveness of this fragmentation of 
transnational policy-making polities is important to keep in analytical sight as this is a chapter 
concerning de-politicised ‘global governance’ in its entire ambit. It is not a chapter about de-
politicised global energy policy, or other global policy issues concerning health, environment, tobacco 
or transport. 
 
‘Scientisation’ can be considered a fourth tactic of de-politicisation (Flinders and Buller, 2006: 313). 
Due to technological and scientific advances, most fields of governance have become highly complex 
requiring regular input and monitoring by highly trained professionals and scientific advisors. 
Reliance on expert consultation, evidence construction and technocratic deliberation in global and 
regional governance creates new cadres of transnational administrators, and institutes ‘knowledge’ 
organisations and their networks as governance institutions.  Knowledge networks do not simply 
intersect GPPPs, international organisations  and other structures of global governance to provide 
expertise. KNETs  also constitute power.  Rather than arguing that this fourth tactic of de-
politicisation is an inherently ‘apolitical’ dynamic, or ‘post-political’ in the sense of completely fore-
closing dissent (Flinders and Buller, 2008: 313; Darling, 2014), epistemic power is in constant 
contest. That is, there are challenges to dominant knowledge groups from competing epistemic 
communities as well as from norm based groups and networks in civil society providing alternative 
visions of policy and re-politicisation of neutral economic theory or policy orthodoxy.  
 
3. Problems and Processes of Global Governance 
 
Global governance has emerged with the complex interdependence of economies and societies as well 
as the attempts of states to cooperate to contain cross-border or transboundary policy problems. But 
both state and global actors are equally important in developing new tactics and tools to de-politicise 
global governance. De-politicisation in global governance involves ‘arena-shifting’ and delegation 
from the institutions of nation-state representative democracy (Flinders and Buller, 2006: 296). This is 
reflective of the birth of new ‘arenas’ of power, authority and decision-making beyond the nation-
states. Yet, it is also symptomatic of a de-politicisation discourse that “seeks to portray certain issues 
as beyond the control of national politicians” (Flinders and Buller, 2006: 299). Many contemporary 
policy problems are transnational whereas governments – local and national – are bound by norms of 
Westphalian sovereignty and cartographic borders. Such state-bound notions of policy making give 
national political elites recourse to disown or deflect policy responsibilities that are global or regional.  
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The global governance literature is extensive and today it has diversified into sub-fields (such a global 
health governance or global environmental governance) and penetrates most social science 
disciplines. However, it emerged from the study of International Relations, and in particular, from 
growing scholarly dissatisfaction of viewing international organisations as the mere tools of state 
interests. A landmark publication – Governing Without Government (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992) – 
not only highlighted the independent institutional agendas and policy powers of international 
organisations but also brought into consideration the neglected global governance roles of non-state 
actors such as in the ‘diagonal’ and ‘unilateral’ categories developed below.  
 
‘Global governance’ has become a key term in the lexicon of international organisations. One 
established yet ‘depoliticised’ definition comes from the World Health Organization (WHO) which 
casts this process as “the way in which global affairs are managed (and as) there is no global 
government, global governance typically involves a range of actors including states, as well as 
regional and international organizations”.1 The WHO is not exceptional. Similar neutral sounding 
definitions can be found on the web-sites of other international organisations.  With the stress on 
‘management’ of global problems, matters of power and authority as well as representation or 
accountability are often de-emphasised. Nevertheless, there is relatively broad agreement around this 
definition that this mode of governance, or management, includes a multiplicity of actors from 
business, civil society, expert communities alongside official actors as shared public-private 
governance and transnational administration.  
 
De-politicisation of global governance is both an un-directed trend and a deliberate tactic of 
international organisations, governments and non-state actors. The de-politicisation comes with four-
fold dispersion of policy making that distinguishes global governance from national modalities of 
governance that oscillates around core government departments and agencies. The first two are 
primarily tactics of institutional de-politicisation led by politicians and civil servants. The second set 
of tactics present a much greater role for non-state actors and for a gradual partial privatisation of 
policy:  
 
Horizontal dispersion, through movement of policy issues and coordination to inter-governmental 
networks between government officials at the same level: that is, networks of legislators, judges and 
regulators who have cross-national counterparts.  The Financial Stability Board of Finance Ministers 
attached to the G20 processes is a well-known case.  Other examples include the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) – an official network of financial regulators with responsibilities for money 
laundering, or the annual Four Countries Conference of chief executives of electoral agencies from 
Australia, NZ, Canada and the UK (Legrand, 2015). This is mostly an inter-governmental dynamic of 
information sharing that recognises the sovereign authority of state officials. 
 
Vertical decentralisation, through trans-governmental networks of public sector officials or 
international civil servants where there is collaboration and attempts at multi-level policy 
coordination. CGIAR (the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research) is possibly the 
oldest known GPPP and in which the World Bank has taken a central convening role and coordinates 
with donor governments as well as a world-wide network of scientific laboratories. There is a 
multiplication of such networks at the regional level. Within the European Union (EU) there is 
considerable density of regulatory networks in areas such as telecommunications, energy and data 
privacy (Eberlein and Newman, 2008). Within Southeast Asia, the ASEAN Committee on Migrant 
Workers, comprising representatives from each members’ labour department, has been tasked with 
negotiating a regional migrant workers’ rights framework and implementing this at the national level.  
 
Diagonal delegation across the public-private divide, whereby government officials and international 
civil servants build partnerships with private sector actors. This can be global public private 
partnerships such as GAVI (previously known as the Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunisation) 
bankrolled by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency 
                                                          
1 http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story038/en/  
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Initiative) and the Global Water Partnership. These ‘global public policy networks’ (sometimes called 
GPPPs) are quasi-public or semi-private. While PPPs and policy networks are very evident within 
national contexts, in global governance the de-politicisation is more extenuated in the absence of a 
central pole of (nation-state) power and clear lines of accountability.  
 
Unilateral initiatives from the private sector and civil society. Partnerships of transnational 
administration can be contrasted with private regimes. For instance, the credit-rating agencies such as 
Moody’s and Fitch but also the ISO are different types of private actors that perform global roles of 
accreditation and co-ordination, respectively. Business sometimes acts unilaterally to deliver public 
goods and services.  Private rule making – such as in global forestry stewardship – is well recognised 
(Chan and Pattberg, 2008). Business groups and other non-state actors often seek to shape and inform 
global policy agendas through preference shaping initiatives like those undertaken at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos or through other dialogue processes.  
 
The quasi-public transnational policy communities that revolve around these four strategies of global 
governance constitute a global public sector or a discernible “global administrative space”, in which 
the strict dichotomy between domestic and international has broken down (Kingsbury, Krisch and 
Stewart, 2005).2 Yet, this ‘public sphere’ or ‘administrative space’ has a qualitatively different 
character to assumptions that prevail concerning sovereign states on matters of public authority and 
legitimate exercise of power.  These de-politicised spaces are ‘distributed’ and ‘dispersed’ (Darling, 
2014); that is, separated into functionally autonomous issue-specific sectors often with their own 
professional language and administrative rationalities.   
 
Formal public actors in global governance – that is, international organisations and states – remain 
very important actors but in terms of financing, regulation and delivery of public goods and services 
they are inextricably reliant on private and civil society actors. The vast diversity of partnership 
arrangements have led another set of observers to describe the trend of private engagement in policy 
combined with some regulatory authority as ‘experimentalist governance’ (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012). It 
has also meant that non-state actors can engage in the framing, definition, implementation and 
enforcement of these norms and rules (Brütsch and Lehmkuhl, 2007). It is a process of constant 
tinkering and adjustment of rules or standards. This tinkering creates opportunities for engagement in 
the ‘global administrative space’ for various expert and stakeholder groups. 
 
However, global standards and best practices that may be adopted in bureaucratically mature OECD 
countries are less likely to be smoothly implemented in poor developing countries, or states in 
conflict, experiencing hampered policy capacity. Consequently, the pattern of implementation across 
countries is also highly uneven and contingent. Moreover, such states may be ‘rule-takers’ rather than 
‘rule-makers’ or key contributors to debates about international best practice and global standards.  
 
At the same time, there may be on-going shifts in the balance of power between different international 
organisations, and continual contests and ‘forum switching’ of global issues and responsibilities. For 
instance, global health issues are addressed by the WHO but increasingly also in a number of World 
Bank initiatives or via public-private partnerships like the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria. In this mix of ‘official’ policy actors, the influential role of a private actors like the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation in shaping global health agendas cannot be ignored  Nor can it be 
overlooked the manner “in which first-world universities and their global health departments control 
the flow of resources for tropical disease control programs” (Harper and Parker, 2014: 202).   
 
Examples from the global health field are indicative of de-politicisation in the gradual moves to 
indirect forms of governing mediated through private actors or autonomous institutions; that is, “of 
delegating responsibilities, (which) centre in particular on replacing – at least in part – politicians with 
experts, redefining political processes in technical terms and transferring tasks and responsibilities to 
                                                          
2     See the program on ‘global administrative law’ at New York University School of Law: 
http://www.iilj.org/gal/GALworkingdefinition.asp  
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non-state actors, for example through the multiple forms of privatisation...” (my insertion, Beveridge 
and Naumann, 2014: 277).  
 
In other words, de-politicisation has been conceptualised as the passing of responsibility and 
accountability away from government (Burnham, 2001; Kuzemko, 2015). This is the case in global 
governance via four routes: First, when decision making and administrative authority is delegated to 
the public-private partnerships and private regimes of the global governance tools outlined above. 
Second, when market principles are introduced, or designed into, the administrative conduct of these 
entities. Third, when technocracy takes hold – scientisation – as discussed below. Fourth, when the 
deliberative space is shrunk as a consequence of high cost access for participation in multiple and 
usually remote policy forums.   
 
4. Global Civil Society 
 
De-politicised global governance is by no means an inevitable process.  The empirical reality is that 
new and innovative governance arrangements have emerged to ameliorate transnational policy 
problems. These governance innovations and experiments may well presage new spheres of public 
action. These spaces are also public spheres where alter-globalisation resistances, subaltern 
governance contestation and unanticipated enactments of policy occur.  For instance, the elite 
government-corporate dialogue of the World Economic Forum convened in Davos is corresponded by 
the so-called ‘other Davos’ of Porte Alegre and the World Social Forum. Accordingly, it is necessary 
to “view politicisation and depoliticisation as ‘multilevel’ concepts” (Wood, 2015: 1). Closure at one 
level may also entail a myriad of new opportunities and policy experimentation elsewhere.  
 
In addition to the deliberative space being shrunk, it is also being comprehensively disaggregated. 
There is a considerable degree of fragmentation in the experimentation with global and regional 
governance instruments.  This diversity is bewildering in itself. It is difficult for national citizenries 
and local communities to see a coherent and connected apparatus of governance, in large part, because 
there is no coherent apparatus or centre of power and authority. Transnational policy responsibilities 
are not only partly privatised but also delegated to sector specific transnational policy communities 
each with their own distinct policy languages, procedures and participants. In the absence of world 
government or sovereign authority and oversight, it “expands the sphere of market-like interactions 
and promotes individual and private choice including self-monitoring alongside or in place of public 
solutions and responsibilities” (Hansen, 2011: 255).  
 
Global civil society has often been credited as a force working to (re-)politicize certain issues 
considered objects of technical regulation or monitoring by states or international institutions.  Social 
movements provide alternative visions and critiques of the prevailing order, notably the ‘Occupy 
Movement’ regarding social and economic inequality.  Crowd-sourcing has been a new technique – 
albeit an ‘ad hoc’ one – for resourcing resistances.  The analytical discourse on ‘global public goods’ 
is an influential reformist paradigm for re-introducing ideas of public responsibility and international 
cooperation on shared policy problems.  
 
NGOs, social movements, faith based organisations, and others  are usually deemed to be located 
outside the ‘‘official’’ political system of governance providing alternatives ‘‘from below.’’  This 
entails several assumptions about the benign, progressive, critical or emancipatory character of global 
civil society. Anti-globalisation or alter-globalisation groups are an important source of counter-
hegemonic discourses (deSousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005). Yet, in certain circumstances, 
civil society actors can contribute to de-politicization when incorporated into UN processes or the 
activities of other international organisations or policy regimes, helping “to remove issues from 
fundamental political contention through participation in and functional contributions to global 
governance” (Jaeger, 2007: 258). ‘Observer status’ or consultative arrangements in many international 
fora can have a quietening effect, disciplining NGOs into more professional and less disruptive 
behaviours Bracking, 2014). It also allows power holders to govern ‘through’ civil society. That is, 
“the role of nonstate actors in shaping and carrying out global governance-functions is not an instance 
 7 
of transfer of power from the state to non-state actors but rather an expression of a changing logic or 
rationality of government (defined as a type of power) by which civil society is redefined from a 
passive object of government to be acted upon into an entity that is both an object and a subject of 
government” (Sending and Neumann, 2006: 651).   
 
Global governance is thus performed through autonomous subjects such as philanthropic foundations, 
transnational networks of NGOs, expert communities and business associations being enrolled into 
the dominant rationality of partnership in global governance. This has been observed with regard to 
international financing of HIV-AIDS programs: 
The considerable HIV/AIDS funding that Africa has received has been channelled to non-
state actors, in effect placing much of the service delivery in the hands of transnational 
networks of private voluntary organisations rather than the African state. Local NGOs 
become drawn into these anti-politics webs of development as they implement the 
programmes of Western donors.” (Burkhardt et al, 2013: 176). 
The networked public-private global governance that works on cooperative relationships with 
‘stakeholders’, NGOs and others puts ‘global civil society’ in a prime position for the de-politicization 
of global governance. Well-known elite and professionalisd international NGOs such as Transparency 
International, Medecins Sans Frontieres or Oxfam or philanthropic bodies like Ford Foundation and 
the Open Societies Foundation network have cooperated and collaborated with both governments and 
international organisations (see inter alia, Roloefs, 2015; Stone, 2013).  The involvement of key civil 
society groups “has political functions, such as signalling consent and ensuring the governability of 
the global population” (Jaeger, 2007: 259).  
 
Likewise, scientists, specialist advisors and policy researchers can be enrolled in support of the 
prevailing order providing scholarly or scientific legitimation. Deferring to scientific expertise, or 
bureaucratic recognition of the need for independent technical and professional advice or oversight in 
the financing, delivery or evaluation of global and regional policy, is another tactic of de-
politicisation. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the role of experts in de-politicisation of 
global governance but with a concern for their interplay in the re-politicisation of global governance 
where science is contested and scholarly authority often in competition.   
 
5. Knowledge Networks and Scientisation of Global Rule 
 
In his book, The Anti Politics Machine, James Ferguson develops a critique of the concept of 
‘development’ which he viewed through the lens of failed attempts, of ‘development agencies’ aiding 
the so-called ‘Third World’ and in particular the World Bank development programs for Lesotho. He 
points to the consistent failure of these agencies to bring about economic stability, poverty alleviation 
and growth. Instead, the anti-politics machine uncompromisingly reduces poverty to a technical 
problem.  
 
By the same token, ‘global governance’ can be understood as a set of discourses that generate 
particular forms of knowledge and causal definitions of global problems around which policy 
solutions and interventions are organised. It is in this context that experts play a critical role: ‘science’ 
or ‘causal knowledge’ is deployed to reduce conditions of ‘uncertainty’.  That is, ‘wicked problems’ 
like climate change, poverty and pandemics. Uncertainty impinges on policymaking at both the level 
of ‘objective’ knowledge of problems as well as the interpretative nature of decision-makers’ 
cognition of that ‘knowledge-base. In an uncertain world of countless cross border problems, 
reassurance is sometimes found in ‘science’. 
 
A dominant discourse of the past 20 years concerns the need to ‘bridge research and policy’ and 
utilise K4D (Knowledge for Development) as well as to measure, evaluate and report on the impacts 
of development interventions (Hout, 2012: 408). For example, in the terrain of global health, the 
Evidence to Policy initiative (E2Pi) aims to help narrow the gap between evidence synthesis and 
practical policymaking and is one among many other initiatives supporting the MDGs  (Yamey and  
Feachem, 2011). This discourse is symptomatic of the wider evidence-based policy movement that 
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emerged in the OECD political economies towards the turn of the century. The lament of disconnect 
between evidence and policymaking has been recently reinvented in a new manifestation or policy 
discourse around ‘science diplomacy’. Common to each manifestation is a desire for improved 
knowledge utilisation in governance in order to generate better policy processes and outcomes.  
 
There is now a substantial body of literature on the manner in which ‘experts’, and various forms of 
expertise, are argued to be central players in de-politicisation strategies in energy policy (Kuzemko, 
2015), global health policy (Burkhardt et al, 2013); the Kyoto climate change regime (Huggins, 2015) 
or the calculative practices of the MDGs (Ilcan and Phillips, 2010). These are issue areas that (attempt 
to) displace deliberation from generalist political actors and the citizenry who are deemed to lack the 
capacity to make fully informed decisions due to the highly technical, complex or science-based 
character of the policy issue.   
 “Underlying depoliticisation strategies is, then, an inherent anti-politics, which seeks to 
preclude conflict and plurality. Politics is framed as inefficient and bureaucratic and 
de/politicisation as a panacea for it: ‘Politics is a pathogen; depoliticisation an antidote’” 
(Beveridge and Naumann, 2014: 277 quoting Hay, 2007).  
And the antidote is concocted by scientists and administered by expert practitioners. Calls for K4D 
and evidence-based policy privilege experts and elevates policy deliberation to technocrats. The 
constraints on wider participation and deliberation are more pronounced in the ecosystem of global 
governance. 
 
Experts enter, or are co-opted into, policy deliberations equipped with information and evidence, 
models and measures, theories and methodologies. Their tactical input to governance is legitimised by 
their professional accreditations, high-level educational qualifications or scientific recognition. 
However, rather than simply observing – monitoring and mapping problems and other phenomena – 
experts also enact and shape that reality. They are not simply tools to be used by international 
organisations , governments or GPPPs but exercise professional agency in their own right.  
 
This is also a view of expert agency as “performance” where “expertise does not serve exclusively to 
legitimize practices, but may translate into material everyday practices through its embedding in 
socio-technical landscapes or networks” (Henriksen, 2013: 408). That is, models and metrics (such as 
the MDGs, or the Basle 4 proposed standard on capital reserves for banks, or ISO guidelines on how 
countries quantify their greenhouse gas emissions) become devices that structure individual and 
organisational behaviours as well as that of nation-states.  
 
Central to expert power in global governance are knowledge networks (KNETs see Ilcan and Phillips, 
2010; Stein, 2001; Stone, 2015). There are different conceptual labels for these networks – inter alia, 
epistemic communities, interpretative communities, discourse coalitions – yet, all these concepts 
share the idea that knowledge can have an independent force in policy-making. Not only do 
transnational KNETs create and transfer knowledge that is both ‘scientific’ and policy relevant, they 
are apparatus for “the necessary hardware and finances to support knowledge acquisition and 
implementation (Stein, 2001: 6–7). KNETs take varying forms. For example, the scholarly ‘networks 
of excellence’ funded by the European Commission differ on criteria of legal status, membership, 
degree of institutionalisation and issue focus when compared to more permanent global scientific 
entities like the Global Forum for Health Research or CGIAR which have long term funding and 
explicit policy missions.  
 
As instruments of global governance, KNETs incorporate professional bodies, academic research 
groups and scientific communities that organise around a special subject matter or issue. Individual or 
institutional inclusion in such networks is based upon professional or official recognition of expertise 
such as commitment to certain journals, conferences or other gatherings and organs that help bestow 
scholarly  and scientific credibility. KNETs are essential for the international spread of research 
results, scientific practice and what is deemed international ‘best practice’ on matters as varied as 
banking standards, immunisation schemes, sustainable fisheries or corporate social responsibility.  
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International organisations and other multilateral initiatives require policy analysis and research to 
support problem definition, outline policy solutions, monitor and evaluate existing policy as well as to 
provide scholarly legitimacy for policy development. In other words, knowledge is a key resource, and 
constitutive element, in global policy development.  
 
Consequently, KNETs can be seen as a type of ‘governmentality’: “technologies of government are 
not simply mechanical devices; they are assemblages of forms of practical knowledge, with practices 
of calculation and types of authority and judgements… (Ilcan and Phillips, 2008: 713; see also Hansen 
and Tang Jensen, 2015: 370).  One micro-example comes from an announcement on EBPDN – the 
Evidence Based Policy and Development Network – where member institutes and think tanks share 
experience regarding their policy initiatives and partnerships:  
The Policy Lab® is pleased to be working on a project jointly run by the World Health 
Organization’s Knowledge Management and Sharing section and the United Nations 
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), towards the end of using “evidence-
based design” as an innovative method to better move knowledge to action in public 
health policymaking.  
By no means unique, the Policy Lab is symptomatic of the specificities of collaborative problem 
solving processes in global governance. Other global governance ‘assemblages’ of socio-technical 
networks of private and public actors (or ‘policy sectors’ and ‘policy communities’ in the old-speak of 
policy studies) include the anti-corruption assemblage (Hansen and Teng-Jensen, 2015; also Hout, 
2012) or the anti-drug policy community (Alimi, 2015) or senior economists working as consultants 
for development agencies and international organisations (see the essays in Mackenzie et al, 2007).  
 
From this theoretical vantage, governance is regarded as a wider societal phenomenon that envelopes 
different kinds of expert communities. Governance is not contained within the architecture of the state 
(Walters, 2012: 11) or only within international organisations. In other words, practical knowledge is 
mobilised to govern a domain (such as banking or energy policy), but is also linked to theories, 
programmes and expertise that supply it with policy objectives and which can thus be viewed as an 
apparatus of rule. Recognising the tactics and techniques by which knowledge organisations seek to 
shape their own conduct (such as via peer review, rigorous methodologies and international rankings), 
or that of other groups or organisations, provides insight into the ‘forms of reason’ and ‘regimes of 
truth’ that operate within institutions and at specific historical junctures (Walters, 2012: 11).  
 
Knowledge production is not divorced from the social and political worlds of the policy process. 
Whilst this point may be obvious, the social practices within KNETs give their product – policy plans, 
publications, analysis – a patina of scientific objectivity and technocratic neutrality. Sophisticated 
computer modelling, positive economic theories or scientific papers published in refereed professional 
journals create ‘communication codes’ that construct some knowledge as more persuasive or reliable. 
These codes are not only expensive to reproduce but difficult to access for the everyday citizen, 
becoming part of the mechanics of de-politicisation. For example, developing competence in the 
intricacies of Basle 3 concerning the global, voluntary regulatory framework on bank capital 
adequacy, stress testing, and market liquidity risk requires significant personal investment in 
comprehending  financial and economic theories of macroprudential regulation.  
 
KNETs are one important manifestation of the ‘technologies’ of global governance, or instruments 
that centralise non-state actors in the problematization, management and monitoring of global issues. 
Anti-policies are a further set of tools of de-politicisation that help shape the preferences of political 
elites in states and international organisations , networks and GPPPs. Other tools and approaches could 
have been discussed – for instance, financial intermediation funds and other global architectures of 
public finance management (see Bracking, 2014) – but space constraints preclude an investigation in 
this chapter.  
 
6. Anti-Policy and De-Politicised Transnational Administration. 
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The idea of anti-policy entails the “repression of ‘bad things’” (Hansen, 2011: 252; Walters, 2008: 
267). That is, the ubiquity of discourses, measures and policies whose stated objectives is to combat 
or prevent bad things’ – ‘global public bads’ such as pollution, species annihilation, or volatility in 
financial markets.  Uncertainty and ambiguity (which are not necessarily ‘bad’ but nonetheless a 
challenging reality) are to be ameliorated through robustness and resilience in the creation, 
management and enforcement of rules, better communication and brokerage of ‘sound’ evidence for 
policy, and the development of indices, scales and other professional measures to evaluate and 
manage ‘the problem’ and engage in surveillance and reporting. Policy design, public administration 
and policy evaluation is de-centered and situated outside politics as a neutral modality of governance. 
 
As a concept, ‘anti-policy’ is not yet fixed. It is cognate to the macro-level ‘anti-politics’ concept but, 
when used, is generally applied at the meso-level of a specific policy sector or issue. It describes the 
proliferation of governmental policies that are against or opposed to a specific societal problem 
(Nyers, 2008: 333). Examples from the policy lexicon include anti-corruption, anti-terrorism, anti-
poverty, anti-drug use, anti-crime, amongst other anti-policies that control populations. In short, ‘anti-
policy’ can be considered one of the tactics of de-politicisation at meso-levels of global governance.  
It focuses on the policies and strategies that name themselves explicitly as ‘anti-’, the kinds 
of legitimacy these might enjoy, the forms of resistance they might face and, not least, the 
productive processes such anti-policies can entail in terms of spurring socio-technical 
networks of people and objects around the problem to be governed. Anti-policies can 
mobilize particular professions, refine knowledge and provide the occasion for creating new 
institutions and technologies to address the undesirable things (Hansen and Tang-Jenson, 
2015: 369). 
Anti-policy is useful for lowering analytical gaze to the meso-level governance of specific global 
policy sectors in which GPPPs, KNETs and private regimes circulate to control a given policy 
problem. The idea of anti-policies also captures the degree of plurality and fragmentation in global 
governance.  Yet, there continues to be a binary distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ conduct or 
‘efficient and effective’ policy versus perverse or politicised policy or ‘wicked problems’ that are 
irresolvable or intractable (for instance, poverty or addiction). Anti-policies draw lines that determine 
identities of subjects they are designed to govern and control as they “aim to separate and differentiate 
the population in the name of protecting it” (Nyers, 2008: 335).  
 
Yet, between the ends of the spectrum there are a wide range of interpretative practices, deviations 
and adjustments that do not fit conveniently into categories of good or bad governance. Professional 
ecologies and scientific communities are not homogenous entities but are diverse in their approaches, 
theoretical inspirations and methods of inquiry. Consensus is often lacking. Anti-policy scholars have 
shown a propensity to focus on experts supporting or reinforcing neo-liberal governmentalities. Yet, 
questioning and contention is also the norm of knowledge communities, where debate and scientific 
dispute is of value and productive. 
 
‘Anti-policy involves a will to technologise and transform an otherwise controversial subject into a 
domain of numbers and facts’ (Walters, 2008: 280) where scenario planning, foresight, regular 
review, planning, and manpower training prevail and help make decision makers and administrators 
‘feel’ more assured or more in control.  Anti-policy is a tactic – that can be rule based, institutional 
and/or scientised – of ‘placing at one remove the political character of decisionmaking’ (Burnham, 
2001: 136). The desire is for a more ‘rational’ or ‘evidence-based’ or ‘targeted’ process of policy 
making where policy goals lead to projected policy outcomes. It is based on instruments such as 
rankings, benchmarking and league tables as well as other calculative devices.  
 
Nonetheless, global anti-policies do not necessarily lead to de-politicisation. These policies can be 
approaches to create transparency and regularity so as to stabilise interpretation of the dimensions of 
transnational policy problems. There is a dual dynamic.  
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De-politicisation “is often characterised, misleadingly, as producing a contraction of both government 
and space within which politics is played out” (Foster and Kerr, 2014: 226) As suggested earlier, 
however, the multifarious modes of global governance are forging new policy spaces, a plurality of 
them, often with attendant public spheres drawn from different elements of national and global civil 
society. There are counter-processes of politicisation. For example, the ‘war on drugs’ regarding the 
trade in illegal substances and criminalisation of drug users has been contested by the alternative 
‘harm reduction’ paradigm of policy thinking through the privately initiated Global Commission on 
Drugs (Alimi, 2015).  In other words, there are “movements of issues between an arena of fate and 
necessity (the non-political), where nothing can be done (depoliticisation), to one of deliberation and 
contingency (the political), where action and change are possible (politicisation)” (for a full 
explanation see Beveridge and Naumann, 2014: 278).  
 
On the one hand, global governance represents a closure of spaces for substantive deliberation and the 
exclusion of participation given the elite venues where much global policy making takes place 
(Jaegar, 2007).  On the other hand, the growth of global civil society, the promises of social media, 
the oppositional tendencies and sources of resistance to a uniformly neo-liberal globalisation depict 
conditions of choice and voice for various citizenries and communities. Through eco-labelling and the 
certification processes of bodies like the Forestry Stewardship Council, consumers can exercise some 
choice (Chan and Pattberg, 2008).  \That is, “global norms can be challenged and rendered 
contingent” (Beveridge and Naumann, 2014: 275). Or as noted elsewhere, “the question of resistance 
at the global level is not necessarily one of rejecting global frames of action, but of how to promote 
alternative frames of action that compete with market ones” (Henriksen, 2013: 409).  
 
Alternatives are not only generated from outside transnational administrative spaces but also from 
inside. It is important not to forget that contestation can also come from inside decision making circles 
(Boswell and Corbett, 2015: 1402). The proliferation of GPPPs has involved ingenuity and innovation 
on the part of international civil servants, private donors and state officials in constructing these new 
institutions but also in seeking legitimacy via a discourse that they deliver ‘global public goods’. 
Experimentalist governance involves policy creativity in response to dissatisfaction with existing 
institutional arrangements.  
 
But partnerships also generate problems. The multi-stakeholder character of GPPPs and their shared 
execution and financing responsibilities does not create a coherent edifice of bureaucratic efficiency. 
Instead, partnerships and networks are as often characterised by miscommunication and conflict.  For 
example, the original vision of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was to 
become a simple financial instrument. However, the proliferation of partners required to sustain the 
Global Fund led to increasing bureaucratization and an undermining of the Fund’s own intentions. 
Today the Fund faces criticism that it has actually impeded resource distribution and grant-giving 
(Taylor and Harper, 2014).  
 
Within scientific communities and KNETs there also are conflicting sources of analysis and 
discordant interpretations of global policy problems. No better example of this can be seen in the 
contestation that surrounds the expert deliberations of the IPCC and continuous re-politicisation of 
climate change issues. Likewise, there can also be situations of deliberately constructed uncertainty.  
For example, the manner in which conservative interests – such as lobbyists, conservative foundations 
(like the Koch or ExxonMobile Foundations) or right wing think tanks – fuel the climate denial 
movement and recalibrate problem definition towards increased uncertainty allowing for policy 
resistances or reversals. In other words, political interests use uncertainty, and amplify it, to re-
politicise issues and pursue their own ends.    
 
Without a doubt, KNETS are a  scientisationtactic of global governance. They cross-cut and intersect 
with international organisations and trans-governmental networks, as well as GPPPs and private 
regimes. But they are composed of diverse sets of unruly and relatively autonomous actors who 
operate with their own interpretations of global realities and explanations of global uncertainties.   
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While de-politicisation of global governance may be reliant on scientisation, it is nevertheless multi-
pronged. Turning a particular social practice like corruption, or environmental phenomena like 
pandemics and climate change, into a problem is hinged to socio-cultural perceptions of what counts 
as good or bad practices is not only created by theories like ‘global public goods/bads’, expert 
modelling or various scientific explanations. Tactics and specific institutional or regulatory tool – in 
the global governance case  technologies like  horizontal intergovernmental networks like the anti-
money laundering regime of FATF; or the trans-governmental networks like the peer-review 
processes and best-practice guidelines convened by the OECD – operationalize the theories and 
interpretations.  
De-politicisation cannot be conceptualised as “a stable endpoint, but an effect or outcome of policies 
or political strategies which can be challenged and reversed” (Beveridge and Naumann, 2014: 277). 
Just as it is valuable to side step away from the stark binaries of ‘global governance’ and ‘anti-
globalization’ to recognise the pluralities of ‘alter-globalisations’, it is also worthwhile to step down 
to the meso-level of policy-making to make visible the professional negotiations and theoretical 
disputes within KNETs and GPPPs.  As relatively new governance innovations, these network or 
partnership tools have also been vulnerable to funding fluctuations, fads and fashions in international 
institutions, and have been disbanded, merged or withered. Not all flourish. Their (potential) 
impermanency and informality in institutional design may well be another feature of de-politicisation.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to redirect attention from the macro-level of de-politicised global governance 
– where there is nonetheless considerable evidence of re-politicisation via cross-national resistances to 
austerity politics found in Occupy or the critical writing of Thomas Piketty as well as social 
movements like those that surround environmental activists and radical thinking of the anthropocene – 
to focus on meso-level anti-policy tools such as global public-private partnerships and knowledge 
networks. A future avenue for research and empirical work is to focus on the micro-level to uncover 
the effects of control technologies deployed by professionals based within the organisational settings 
of global programs, and to unravel their models, vocabularies and categories that determine the 
particular shape of financial allocations, reporting procedures and service delivery mechanisms.  
 
In the diverse ecosystem of global governance, this chapter has focused on networks and partnerships 
as depoliticising tactics of global governance. GPPPs and KNETs emerged with dissatisfaction with 
the policy capacities of traditional institutions – states, inter-governmental organisations and multi-
lateral agreements. As new governance institutions they are not only tools of de-politicisation that 
take the management of global problems to distant and technocratic administrative realms. As 
experimentalist governance (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012), these networks also represent venues of 
creativity and innovation on the global governance landscape.  
 
GPPPs and KNETS also represent new spheres of public activity, ripe for re-politicisation.  These are 
not non-political spaces but are subject to a variety of disruptions from within as policies are 
performed or implemented in unexpected ways. These structures are also subject to occasional 
criticism from different logics of perception (Darling, 2015) manifest in local oppositions, global civil 
society resistances, or critiques from alternative professional and scientific networks.  KNETs in 
particular, are not stable as ‘scientisation’ tools given the value of questioning, critical analysis and 
debate in scholarly and scientific communities.    
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